South Africa's National Security Management System, 1972-90 by Seegers, Annette
 
 
South Africa's National Security Management System, 1972-90
Author(s): Annette Seegers
Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 253-273
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/161023
Accessed: 07-09-2017 10:12 UTC
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to The Journal of Modern African Studies
This content downloaded from 137.158.158.60 on Thu, 07 Sep 2017 10:12:06 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Journal of Modern African Studies, 29, 2 (1991), pp. 253-273
 South Africa's National Security
 Management System, 1972-90
 by ANNETTE SEEGERS*
 ANALYSES of the South African state during the I970s and I98os all
 tried to come to grips with the role of the security forces.1 Research
 justifiably ran in different directions, but the National Security
 Management System soon became an essential part of recent work,2
 albeit remaining very much of a mystery.3 Since we need to know how
 it originated, developed, and operated in practice, as well as its legacy,
 this article attempts to describe the N.S.M.S. and offers avenues of
 interpretation.
 PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY EFFECTS AND INFLUENCE
 A significant feature of the N. S. M. S. was the extent to which it was
 surrounded - and, indeed, its very existence justified - by perceptions
 of various attributes. Bureaucrats and politicians often claimed that
 the military produced superior and timely ideas, that military men
 were leaders, and that the South African Defence Force (S.A.D.F.)
 best knew how to do things. From beyond official circles, even the
 highly critical interpretation that the N. S. M. S. was the real but covert
 government, ironically supported such a line of reasoning.
 The origins of the perceptions lie between 196 , when South Africa's
 departure from the Commonwealth severed the link with the United
 Kingdom's security institutions and interests, and the creation in I972
 * Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town.
 Currently a Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, The Smithsonian
 Institution, Washington, D.C.
 1 For example, Jackie Cock and Laurie Nathan (eds.), War and Society: the militarisation of South
 Africa (Cape Town, I989); Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: civil-military relations in South
 Africa (Cambridge, I984); and Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarisation of South African Politics
 (London, 1986).
 2 Except where otherwise indicated, the term 'state' refers to government and associated
 bureaucracies, while 'security forces' include the military and the police.
 3 With the accession ofF. W. de Klerk to power, the N. S. M. S. was changed into the National
 Co-ordinating Mechanism (N.C.M.). For a more complete assessment, see Annette Seegers,
 'After Angola and With De Klerk: current trends in South Africa's security establishment', in
 Vernon J. Kronenberg et al. (eds.), The Military and Democracy (forthcoming). Because of this
 transition, I here use the past tense in describing the N. S. M. S.
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 of the State Security Council (S. S. C.).4 During the I96os the Cabinet
 eventually realised that the confidential reports being received reflected
 the interests of one or other of the various rival organisations in this
 field. What was required was one national agency to co-ordinate
 information from subordinate bodies. The Potgieter Commission,
 briefed to inquire into 'matters relating to the security of the state', led
 to the adoption of the Security Intelligence and State Security Council
 Act of I972, and to the creation of the S.S.C. The forum for that ideal
 single voice advising the Cabinet was in place.5
 The formal creation of a national security agency failed to put an end
 to the rivalries of the I96os. Some bureaucrats between I972 and I980
 also produced grossly inaccurate 'intelligence',6 while others demon-
 strated a weakness for corruption and ineptitude. A series of inquiries
 and investigations reported on the gap between the need for national
 security and its achievement, as well as the deficiencies of actions taken
 by civilians in this field.7 The decision that effective implementation
 required a military-style apparatus was much boosted when the
 Minister of Defence, P. W. Botha, became Prime Minister in 1979 in
 the wake of the so-called 'Information Scandal', and said he valued
 above all else the need for 'clean' and 'efficient' government coupled
 with 'teamwork'.8 By the end of the I970s, official perceptions of the
 situation were simple: at an appropriate time, those associated with the
 S. A. D. F. produced a superior understanding of the threats facing the
 Government, and the best ideas about how these should be countered.
 Comparisons of departmental responsibilities for national security led
 4 Annette Seegers, 'Extending the Security Network to the Local Level: a .clarification and
 some further comments', in Politeia (Pretoria), 7, 2, I988, pp. I20-5.
 5 Politicians (including the Prime Minister) between I961 and 1970 usually de-emphasised
 threats to South Africa or remained otherwise convinced that the regime had sufficient strength
 to ward them off. Public warnings of a fierce general assault started to appear from the S. A. D. F.
 (and the Minister of Defence) in 1970. James Selfe, 'The Total Onslaught and the Total Strategy:
 adaptations to the security intelligence decision-making structures under P. W. Botha's
 administration', M.A. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1987, pp. II 5-24.
 6 The most conspicuous failure was the prediction by the Department of Foreign Affairs about
 election results in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). See Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation:
 South African foreign policy making (Johannesburg, I984), pp. I I8-19, for Pretoria's heavy backing
 of Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council.
 7 The relevant documents remain classified, including that known to bureaucrats as the Venter
 Report, produced in I975 for the Public Service Commission. When interviewed in Pretoria, 22
 November 1989, J. J. Venter pointed to the decisive role of P. W. Botha and close associates in the
 mid-1970s, as well as to the importance of the Oorlogsdagboek (Diary of War), created in 1918 in
 conjunction with the Colonial Office, as a place to record threats. When instructed to examine this
 diary, Venter found that entries had stopped in I968. See also, Magnus Malan, 'Die Aanslag
 Teen Suid-Afrika', in Issup Strategic Review (Pretoria), November I984, pp. 3-I6, and the post-
 1975 White Papers on Defence and Armaments Supply.
 8 Geldenhuys, op. cit. pp. 84-9.
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 SOUTH AFRICA S NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM
 to the view that the S. A. D. F. was efficient and prepared, with serious
 wrongs being attributed to civilians.9
 Perceptions of military leadership were underscored by the post- I 983
 revival of violent resistance. In comparing the performance of
 departments, the conclusion was again reached that civilians had
 failed, not least because of their own shaken confidence in the ability to
 maintain facilities in areas where violence was most intense. Even
 worse, some local bureaucrats were thought to have covertly sought a
 modus vivendi with resistance groups so as to continue services. As was the
 case in the I96os and I970s, perceptions were partly based on fact. It
 could be shown that many civilians had failed to meet their own goals.
 Most attention now focused on the Department of Constitutional
 Development and Planning whose responsibilities included the black
 town councils of which, by October 1985, only a fraction remained
 intact and operational.10
 The perceptions embedded in the N. S. M. S. did have consequences.
 Initially, the Government issued strong denials,"l but later statements
 made a case for the benefits derived from the military's positive rl6e in
 South Africa,l2 with actions such as those in Alexandra being widely
 publicised as evidence.l3 For critics, this constituted proof that the
 N. S. M. S. was really ruling South Africa.'4 What was done selectively,
 9 As in the following: Republic of South Africa, Report of the Office of the Prime Minister, i98o
 (Pretoria, I980); the explanations of Lieutenant-General Pieter van der Westhuizen in David
 Braun, 'Malan Lifts Covers Off Government's National Security System', in The Argus (Cape
 Town), I2 March I976; and General A. J. van Deventer's 'Briefing to the Press on 2 September
 I983 by the Secretary of the State Security Council', Pretoria, I983, as well as his later article in
 Die Burger (Cape Town), 27 May I986. See also, Jack Spence, 'Politicians in Army Fatigues', in
 Sunday Tribune (Durban), i September I985.
 10 Simon Baynham, 'Political Violence and the Security Response', in Jesmond Blumenfeld
 (ed.), South Africa in Crisis (London, I987), pp. 107-I3. See also the Government's various
 justifications when a state of emergency was initially introduced in July 1985 for 36 magisterial
 districts, when eight more were added three months later, and when subsequent emergency
 regulations were applied and renewed nationally.
 'u See Republic of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly (Cape Town), 112, 27
 January-9 March I984, cols. 29-Io6, for perhaps the most strongly-worded attack on those who
 were critical of military influence in government.
 12 For example, General Malan's claims that the N. S. M. S. was neither sinister nor secret, and
 his references to services rendered, as reported in Braun, loc.cit., and the statement by the
 Information Minister, Stoffel van der Merwe, about addressing grievances, 'Stoffel on Stability',
 in the Financial Mail Johannesburg), I 3 February I987.
 13 Foreign visitors to South Africa were taken on tours through the area. For press coverage,
 see Mark van der Velden, 'A Face-Lift for Alexandra', in The Natal Witness (Pietermaritzburg),
 i8 March I987; Spencer Reiss, 'The Tale of Alexandra', in Newsweek (New York), 30 March
 I987; Johan Vosloo, 'Vaarwel aan die Oue', in Rapport (Johannesburg), 19 April 1987; and the
 statements by J. S. Burger, an Alexandra administrator, as reported in The Star Johannesburg),
 6 March I987, and in The Citizen (Johannesburg), 9 March i987.
 14 The view of the African National Congress is given in 'JMC's Centres for Control and
 Repression', in Sechaba (London), January I988. See also, Simon Baynham, 'South Africa: the
 10-2
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 in Alexandra and other townships like Mamelodi, Mbekweni, or New
 Brighton, was taken to be what was done generally. Equally erroneous
 was the belief that the N.S.M.S. entities existed and operated as
 described by officials. Consequences can also be found elsewhere.
 Within the state, the organisation's administrative staff offered courses,
 awarded qualifications, and gave lectures on how bureaucrats were
 supposed to work. Doing one's job properly meant acquiring the right
 motivation, best inculcated when the person(s) concerned realised that
 inefficiency - disregarding instructions, putting departmental/personal
 interests before the national good, or sloppiness- might lead to a
 communist takeover and revolution.
 South African bureaucrats would have had plenty of food for
 thought if they had studied the depressing record of attempted military
 'clean-ups' elsewhere, but they were not encouraged to critically
 examine the claims that civilian ways of doing things needed to be
 reduced, if not ended. On the contrary, the seductive power of the
 belief in military competence and influence was enhanced when
 advocates cited 'facts' about happenings within government during
 the last 20 years as 'proof' of the wisdom and practicability of their
 ideas. And then they set forth to educate others to accept their
 diagnosis.
 THE INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE N.S.M.S.
 The first phase in the creation of a national security management
 system began with South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth
 in 1961, and ended in the establishment of the State Security Council
 in 1972. The second started with the recognition that the S. S. C., in its
 existing form, was inadequate, and ended with the announcement that
 the N.S.M.S. had become fully operational in August I979.16 The
 third phase involved post-1980 developments, partly during the state of
 emergency.
 As mentioned earlier, rivalry between security agencies in the I96os
 had led to the recognition that a single institution was required to co-
 Government in the shadows', in Africa Confidential (London), 28, I4, 8 July 1987, pp. 1-4; 'The
 Network: from Soweto to De Aar to Ogies to Koega to Koppies', and Anton Harber, 'The
 Uniformed Web that Sprawls Across the Country', in The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 3 October
 i986; Peter Gastrow, 'The Real Message Is: the military's ruling the country', in ibid. 7
 November 1986; and Neill Ross, 'JMCs Usurping Role of Public Representatives', in The Cape
 Times, 28 November I986.
 15 The administrative section of the N.S.M.S. was located in Pretoria, and headed by
 A. P. Stemmet (formerly of the Department ofJustice), who provided me with information about
 the training given there.
 16 Republic of South Africa, g98o Report of the Office of the Prime Minister (Pretoria, I980).
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 ordinate information. Submissions to the resulting Potgieter Com-
 mission remain classified, but the final report favoured an institutional
 and functional design along the lines found in the West.17 Thus, the
 S. S. C. was formally endowed with the status of being a sub-committee
 of the Cabinet by statutory legislation in I972.
 In its second phase, the role of the security system was extended
 because of a perceived need to co-ordinate not only information but
 also the making and implementation of policies. The S. S. C. itself was
 strengthened by additional staff, and a working committee was
 created, consisting of all heads of government departments and staff
 from other cabinet committees. A survey of the scope of executive
 bureaucracy identified 15 functions, including civil defence, culture,
 manpower, and transport, that each required a co-ordinating inter-
 departmental committee (I.D.C.). In addition, a joint management
 centre (J.M.C.) was established to co-ordinate government activities
 in each of South Africa's 12 official regions, as was a sub-J. M. C. in
 each of the 60 sub-regions, and a mini-J. M. C. in each of the 450 or so
 mini-regions, while a local management centre (L.M. C.) was created
 for every city and designated town.
 Co-ordinating executive functions thus required a new set of
 institutions. At the national level, there was the S.S.C. (with its
 specialist committees, notably the working committee and the I. D. C.s).
 But the rest of the bureaucracy functioned on a geographical basis -
 regional, sub-regional, and so on - and for each a single co-ordinating
 body was created (J.M.C., sub-J.M. C., mini-J. M.C., and L.M. C.).
 Efficiency required more than co-ordination, however, and the
 specified hierarchical relationships were intended to shorten and
 simplify the chain-of-command: L.M.C.s reported to mini-J. M. C.s,
 these in turn to sub-J. M. C.s, to J. M. C.s and, finally, to the S.S. C.18
 After 1980, in its third phase, the N.S.M.S.'s development was
 influenced by bureaucratic factors within the state and, from beyond,
 by the revival of violent resistance. The newness of entities meant that
 forms and functions had to be clarified to bureaucrats. At regional and
 local levels, many boundaries were redrawn as, for example, when a
 mini-J. M. C. was redefined to become a sub-J. M. C., or a L. M. C. was
 called into existence. At the top level, the depth and scope of violence
 initiated by opposition to the 1983 constitution led to an important
 alteration. The I. D. C. for security was selected to monitor and manage
 17 Republic of South Africa, Report [Abridged] of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to
 the Security of the State (Pretoria, I972).
 18 The outline here is largely based on the 1980 Report of the Office of the Prime Minister, pp. I-I I,
 and Van Deventer, op. cit.
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 events on an almost daily basis, and was renamed the national joint
 management centre (N.J.M.C.). Described as the 'operational
 headquarters' of the N.S.M.S. by those who ought to know,19 this
 became the body to which all J.M.C.'s reported. Meetings were
 chaired by the Deputy Minister of Law and Order.20
 The institutional origins of the N. S. M. S. thus stem from the poor
 advice given to the Cabinet in the I96os. The diagnosis of what was
 wrong led to the creation of the S.S.C. by a swift stroke of the
 legislative pen. Later judgements that civilian departments had failed
 required a more comprehensive or systemic cure, however, and were
 dictated by the powers of administrative discretion. The goal now was
 to co-ordinate executive-bureaucratic functions at every level. From its
 humble beginnings as providing advice to the Cabinet, the S.S.C.
 ended astride a hierarchy of institutions intended to lead the whole
 state to efficiency.
 THE N.S.M.S.: WHO PARTICIPATED IN WHAT?
 The jurisdictional boundaries of N. S. M.S. structures were mainly
 geographic. AJ. M. C. was responsible for the co-ordination of a region
 (for example, Eastern Province), as was a sub-J. M. C. for a sub-region
 (like Port Elizabeth) and a mini-J. M. C. for a mini-region (such as Port
 Elizabeth North). We know that the internal design of these entities
 compelled the involvement of all government departments. But which
 bureaucrats participated? and how was the work divided?
 Each J.M.C., sub-J.M.C., mini-J.M.C., and L.M.C. had the
 following: (I) A committee for security, known by its Afrikaans
 acronym Veikom, required participation by the Department of Defence,
 the National Intelligence Service, the S.A.D.F., the South African
 Police, and the chief civil defence officer of the region.21 (2) A
 committee for constitutional, economic, and social affairs, known as
 Semkom, was composed of bureaucrats from the relevant civilian
 departments. (3) A committee for communication, known as Komkom,
 was attended by public relations officers from the Bureau for
 19 Including R. P. Meyer, former Deputy Minister of Law and Order.
 20 The National Joint Management Centre came into effect towards the end of 1986, and its
 existence was publicly acknowledged. Confusion did, however, arise in nomenclature, as the old
 I. D.C. was known as the Gesamentlike Veiligheidskomitee (or G.V. K.), and some officials referred to
 this body by its older name and not as the N.J. M. C. See Hennie Kotze, 'Aspects of the Public
 Policy Process in South Africa', in Albert Venter (ed.), South African Government and Politics
 Johannesburg, 1989), pp. I70-200.
 21 The Veikom was aided in its work by a joint intelligence committee (Afrikaans acronym
 G. I. K.) and a joint operational committee (G. O. S.).
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 Information and the Combined Operations section of the S.A.D.F.
 Finally, the chairmen of Komkom, Semkom, and Veikom formed (4) a
 Uitvoerende Komitee, or executive committee; they elected an overall
 chairman, and made use of a secretary.
 A four-part division of labour thus prevailed, with the Veikom
 dominating security issues, the Semkom developmental progress, and the
 Komkom in charge of public relations, with the Uitvoerende Komitee
 providing necessary links in the chain-of-command.22 Every govern-
 ment institution had to participate in one or another committee of the
 N. S. M.S. on national, regional, sub-regional, mini-regional, and
 municipal levels. If the most senior officials were unable to attend - as,
 indeed, required - they were represented by other bureaucrats.
 However, there were at least two areas where participation was not,
 strictly speaking, so restricted. The N.S.M.S.'s concern with pre-
 venting a 'revolutionary climate' meant that most actions focused on
 black communities where administration, since the mid-1970s, had
 been problematic for a variety of reasons. But criticisms were frequently
 made about blacks who became municipal officers either by a little (or
 even no) explained appointment, or by election on the basis of an often
 ludicrously-low turnout. Self-promotion and governmental patronage
 similarly produced a number of Coloured officials, especially in the
 Western Cape.23 Given such participants, the N. S. M. S. in most areas,
 and in a very obvious way, clung to the letter but not the spirit of the
 officials-only claim.
 In the second instance, N. S. M. S. entities were required to liaise with
 local communities and, to this end, links were promoted with
 developmental associations at all levels. Thus the J.M.C. of, for
 example, N?rthern Natal, liaised with the chairman of the Regional
 Development Advisory Committee of KwaZulu, Northern Natal, and
 Northern Transkei (Development Region E). Within this region and
 on a town level, the L. M. C. of Empangeni-Richards Bay, for example,
 22 The internal design of the N. S. M. S. was recorded by officials and observers in the following:
 Harber, loc.cit.; Lester Venter and Norman West, 'Enter the Peace Corps', in The Sunday Times
 Johannesburg), 2 November I986; Dennis Cruywagen, 'JMCs - a Network of Secrets', in The
 Argus, 28 November I986; Tos Wentzel, 'Security Council's Silence on Secret JMCs', in ibid. 9
 December 1986; David Braun, 'Govt Plans to Hijack Revolution for its Own Ends', in The Star,
 17 March I987; Vosloo, loc.cit.; and Moira Levy, 'Fumbled Bid to Hush Security Debate', in The
 Weekly Mail, 28 November 1987. See also, Mark Swilling and Mark Phillips, 'The Powers of the
 Thunderbird', in Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa at the End of the Eighties Johannesburg,
 1989), pp. 29-73; Seegers, 'Extending the Security Network to the Local Level', pp. 132-5; and
 Selfe, op. cit. pp. 115-8o.
 23 The actions of the so-called management committees in the Coloured areas of the Cape
 Province were discussed in 'Bonteheuwel's Silent War', in Upfront (Cape Town), 6, April I987,
 and New Era (Cape Town), April 1987.
 259
This content downloaded from 137.158.158.60 on Thu, 07 Sep 2017 10:12:06 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ANNETTE SEEGERS
 liaised with the chairman of the Lower Umfolozi Community Chest. In
 addition, formal liaison forums were established in order to bring
 together prominent members of the community, including leaders in
 education, business, and religion. Clearly the N.S.M.S.'s need for
 information led to the involvement of some private individuals,
 although they may not have become privy to Veikom secrets.24
 Participation in the N.S.M.S. thus primarily took the form of
 compulsory attendance at meetings of committees at each level by
 representatives of all the relevant institutions of the state. But
 membership was not always confined to those required to attend,
 because some non-officials were also involved, by either self-promotion
 or invitation.
 THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF THE N.S.M.S.
 Obviously the four committees of the I 2 J. M. C.s, 60 sub-J. M. C.s,
 approximately 450 mini-J. M. C.s, and the myriad L. M. C.s were not at
 all times equally and fully operational. Hence the need to raise
 questions about conditions affecting their functions.
 First, despite being described as neither secret nor sinister, the
 N.S.M.S. lived under the umbrella provided by strict statutory
 constraints on the dissemination of information about the security
 forces and their actions. This cover was drastically enlarged by
 emergency regulations.25 But what of the confidential matters discussed
 inside committees as co-ordination would require? Even for the
 24 Information provided in this paragraph was derived from: unsigned report of statements by
 the chairman of the National Regional Development Advisory Council, Dr Piet Rautenbach,
 'Military to Have Voice in Local Decisions', in The Argus, 24 June I986; Braun's report on
 Alexandra, loc. cit.; Patrick Cull's report ofJ. M. C. liaison in the Port Elizabeth area in 'Minister:
 PE area has six JMCs', in Eastern Province Herald (Port Elizabeth), 2 April I987; unsigned report,
 'Principal Tells of Unexpected JMC Meeting [in Athlone]', in South (London), 7 May 1987;
 unsigned report of activities in Hout Bay entitled 'JMC Proposal at Secret Indaba', in New Nation
 (Cape Town), I I June I987; Diana Games's report on the r6le of the Johannesburg Chamber of
 Commerce, Randburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Transvaal Chamber of Industries,
 the Security Association, and the Engineers Association of South Africa, entitled 'New Security
 Network Set Up', in Business Day (Johannesburg), i6 July 1987; unsigned report of manpower
 liaison committees in the Johannesburg area entitled 'Control Centres', in The Financial Mail
 Johannesburg), 24 July I987; Gavan O'Connor's report of liaisons in the Port Elizabeth area in
 'Forum Links Government, Private Sector', in Eastern Province Herald, 8 September I987; and
 Franz Kruger's investigation of the link between the 'Greater East London Coordination
 Committee' and J. M. C.-activity in that area as reported in 'Liberals Linked to Covert Security
 Panel', in The Weekly Mail, 2I-27 November I987. See also, Annette Seegers, 'Local Government:
 state strategy - the national security management system and the joint management centres', The
 Urban Foundation, Johannesburg, I988.
 25 This cover was demonstrated in the legal proceedings instituted against the Minister of Law
 and Order over action taken in the Crossroads area of the Western Cape during I986.
 Information supplied by the Legal Resources Centre in Cape Town.
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 governmental members, however, information came only on a need-to-
 know or too-late basis, and generally flowed vertically upwards to the
 N.J. M. C. and S. S. C. from Veikoms. The activities of these executive
 committees often surpassed those of Komkoms and Semkoms, not
 surprisingly because of successive states of emergency,26 but their
 closed-shop habits offended civilian bureaucrats. In addition, the
 latter's image of standing aloof from government repression was hurt
 by intense Veikom activity, wherein co-ordination seemed merely to
 consist of supporting the unpleasant elements of state business.
 Second, when interviewed, officials typically referred to their
 membership of a J. M. C. but, when asked to be more specific, often
 could not comply. Indeed, those in the same entity would disagree
 about whether they were part of a mini-J. M. C. or a L. M. C., and were
 uncertain about broader hierarchical outlines. The reason for the
 confusion was not hard to find. Most committees were located on the
 local level of government where boundaries were drawn and redrawn
 in accordance with the 1983 constitution and, with the subsequent
 spread of violence, because of variations in the kinds of bureaucracies
 involved in the affairs of black areas. An allocated place in the
 N. S. M. S. network could change very quickly.27
 To give a few examples. Where a black township fell under the
 authority of a neighbouring white municipality, an L.M. C. could
 assume responsibility for both, and thus would report to the relevant
 mini-J. M. C. If the size of the town warranted it, however, it could
 contain a sub-J. M. C. (e.g. Port Elizabeth) with mini-J. M. C.s (e.g. for
 Port Elizabeth and Port Elizabeth North). If the black area there
 lacked independent municipal authority (e.g. Walmer), such a mini-
 J. M. C. (i.e. Port Elizabeth) did not contain a L. M. C. If it lacked any
 formal municipal status, and if it also did not link up with the adjacent
 white municipality, its affairs were administered by the regional office
 of the Department of Constitutional Planning and Development and,
 as such, would form part of the sub-J. M.C. (e.g. Mbekweni, a
 26 This interpretation is suggested by the number of arrests, as well as by the selectivity of
 upgrading efforts. According to the Black Sash, 'Greenflies': municipal police in the Eastern Cape
 (Mowbray, i988), p. 4, between 25,000 and 40,00o were detained during the first year of the third
 state of emergency (or after I2 June I986).
 In an interview during early i988, the Secretary of the State Security, General C.J. Lloyd,
 indicated that upgrading projects were selected on a 'strategic' basis, and that several were in
 communities which formerly had been scheduled for removal- or, stated differently, where
 infrastructural development had ceased. His views were supported by the fact that many
 communities did not receive socio-economic assistance despite their urgent needs.
 27 J. M. C. boundaries were roughly equivalent to S. A. D. F. command areas, but those of lower
 entities seemed to follow S.A. P. jurisdictions.
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 community formerly scheduled for removal). Where a black area did
 have independent municipal status (e.g. Lekoa, near Johannesburg), it
 could contain a L.M.C. but, if warranted by size, a mini-J.M.C.
 emerged.
 Finally, officials in black areas often held the N. S. M. S. and Veikom
 actions in high regard. But for those not spurred by immediate
 problems and accompanying violence, participation was an un-
 rewarded burden. The system demanded an additional layer of
 bureaucratic work with extra meetings, reports, and travel. Yet,
 N. S. M. S. trainers insisted that even enthusiastic participation would
 not lead to substantial personal or departmental reward. The incentive
 was the pleasure to be had from knowing that your work was being
 done more effectively. Many officials justified their indifference to the
 N. S. M. S. by arguing that although undoubtedly appropriate for black
 areas, the new search for efficiency added to their own workloads, failed
 to rid the state bureaucracy of its appetite for 'red tape',28 and
 probably fuelled local feuds and jealousies.29
 Interest and participation in the N. S.M.S. thus varied across time
 and place, but was usually related to the presence or prospect of
 violence, as well as the self-motivation of bureaucrats. Many not so
 threatened or moved, remained sceptical about the real need for more
 unrewarded additions to their daily routine, not least because the
 perpetrators of unpleasantness were getting too close. In short, the
 N. S. M. S. had to rely on the security forces at the disposal of Veikoms
 in black areas.
 MONEY, MONEY, MONEY
 The clandestine nature of the N. S. M. S. drove the issue of security
 expenditures deeper into the recesses of the state. Whereas secrecy
 formerly mainly concerned events related to the central government,
 the N. S. M. S. created undisclosed spending on regional, sub- and mini-
 regional, and local levels. Further, while previously rationalised as the
 inevitable consequence of having to buy arms on the international
 black market, hidden budgets now meant that funds were being
 28 Seegers, 'Extending the Security Network to the Local Level', pp. 50-70. Bureaucrats
 frequently complained about having to travel long distances between, for example, a mini- and
 a sub-J.M.C., in order to attend N.S.M.S. meetings which often dealt with inconsequential
 and/or routine affairs.
 29 Some of these were personal likes and dislikes, but others involved more enduring disputes
 between institutions. For example, the apparent reluctance of the S.A.P. to permit the
 deployment of the S.A. D. F. during unrest in Sebokeng (Lekoa) led to substantial damage to the
 city council's property.
 262
This content downloaded from 137.158.158.60 on Thu, 07 Sep 2017 10:12:06 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM
 allocated secretly for domestic and often partisan reasons. This
 heightened public criticism of the N. S. M. S. as much as redirecting and
 sharpening disputes about spending within the state.
 First of all, the N.S. M.S. perpetuated battles among security
 agencies over how best to manage South Africa's problems. An
 enduring difference concerned the weight to be given to international/
 regional and domestic security, with emphases on, respectively,
 relatively high technology and labour-intensive spending. The domestic
 preoccupation of the N. S. M. S. certainly favoured increased funds for
 the S.A.P. and other policing institutions rather than the S.A.D.F.,
 and hence the more dire needs of some communities were met, albeit
 on a very selective basis.30 Municipal police, for example, were
 recruited by the Department of Manpower, partially trained by the
 S.A.P., and finally resorted under the authority of the Department
 of Constitutional Development and Planning.31 For a time it seemed
 as if the military's grip on the coffers of the state was being loosened.
 Second, the N. S. M. S.'s concern with the causes of violence pointed
 to a long list of ugly realities in the lives of many blacks. A single visit
 to, say, a community once scheduled for removal, told a horrible tale
 of what ending development had done over time to the provision of
 education, electricity, water, housing, roads, and other services, and
 the costs of even small improvements in material conditions were
 staggering. The central authorities could help, for example, by using
 the presidential housing fund and by increasing departmental budgets,
 but most marginalised communities could not finance upgrading
 because the residents themselves either resisted or were unable to pay
 rates and taxes. A way had to be found to transfer money from wealthy
 white municipalities to poorer areas. Hence the identification of
 'priorities' by the N.S.M.S., because with this information the
 regional services councils (R.S.C.s) could then redistribute local
 wealth.
 Third, the description of the I980s as an age of scarcity helps to
 explain the N. S. M. S.'s links with development associations and liaison
 forums. For the state, business interest in projects contributed to a
 better climate for economic development and, more to the point, made
 funds available.32 Local investment was encouraged as developers once
 30 On the spending issue, see Seegers, 'After Angola and with De Klerk'.
 31 As from i990, the S.A. P. took command of municipal police forces.
 32 [Then Brigadier] C.J. Lloyd, 'The Importance of Rural Development in the Defence
 Strategy of South Africa and the Need for Private Sector Involvement', Workshop of the Urban
 Foundation, Natal Region, Io August I979.
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 deterred by the presence of a nearby slum-like community saw that its
 upgrading was evidence of a governmental change of policy and a
 better infrastructure.33 The private sector's involvement with the
 N. S. M. S. not only provided valuable information about local events
 but created opportunities for financial advances. Construction firms,
 for example, gained by successful tenders for housing projects.34
 Concurrently, more companies came to realise that they could
 profitably promote an image of social awareness by visible concern
 with the surrounding community, or gain a reputation for political
 sensitivity cultivated by opposing security agencies.35
 Finally, because the N.S.M.S. drew together in committees those
 already employed by the state and/or seconded personnel, its staffing
 and running costs were low. In addition, it was not presented as the
 vehicle by which hidden 'slush funds' were distributed.36 State
 expenditures remained as approved by the legislature with, in other
 words, itemised financial allocations being held inviolate.37 Upsets in
 existing bureaucratic habits arose mainly from formal accusations
 about weakness or incompetence, but those criticised could at least
 console themselves with the knowledge that their budgets were exempt
 from interference.
 There is no doubt that secretive spending by the state was extended
 to hitherto unknown levels by the National Security Management
 System. Although the full financial story cannot be told, it seems that
 the N. S.M. S. did not preside over large funds of its own. But it was
 able to alter the balance of spending among security agencies, to
 rearrange state financing in conjunction with the R. S. C.s, to link the
 resources of businesses to state projects, and to criticise the use of money
 by civilian departments.
 a3 See, for example, the physical proximity of new businesses and industries to projects being
 upgraded in Alexandra and Mbekweni.
 34 Newspapers in the Eastern Cape, for example, benefited from the upsurge of tender
 advertisements. In other areas, construction projects, particularly those of private dwellings,
 plainly advertised the companies involved.
 35 For example, the switching fortunes of Carl Coetzer of P. E. Tramways in the Eastern Cape.
 36 According to A. P. Stemmet of the N. S.M. S.
 37 However, a J. M. C. could recommend to the S. S. C. that certain actions be taken, according
 to General Malan, and then 'arrangements could be made for the Treasury to release the
 necessary funds to the departments concerned, and this amount would later be approved by
 Parliament as part of the annual Additional Appropriation for that Department'. David Braun,
 'Malan Tells of 2 Bodies That "Defuse Unrest"', in The Star, I2 March 1986.
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 INTO THE NATIONAL CO-ORDINATING MECHANISM
 Within weeks of de Klerk presiding over his first cabinet meeting, it
 was announced that the N. S. M. S. had been replaced by the National
 Co-ordinating Mechanism (N. C. M.), described in the accompanying
 documentation as a network of committees focusing on socio-economic
 development rather than security. Henceforth, co-ordinating state
 functions would mainly be at the discretion of regional and local
 officials.38 Has there just been a change of nomenclature?
 The N.J. M. C. has been abolished, as has the office of its chairman,
 the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, and the national decision-
 making momentum of the S.S. C. - of which de Klerk was never a
 member - has been curbed. The influence of the military and civilian
 bureaucrats has been reduced by the stipulation that only politicians
 should be members of the S.S.C., by the decision that the
 administrative strength of its secretariat should be slashed,39 and by the
 creation of the Cabinet Committee for Security Affairs (C. C.S.A.).
 The S.S.C. had been criticised not only by those who wished to
 maintain the 'apolitical' nature of the civil service, but also by military
 men who argued that although the S. A. D. F. was an instrument of the
 state, it should not be used to prop up a failing civil service - in other
 words, a 'purification' of its agenda was necessary.40
 There is no doubt that the usually small N.S.M.S. committees
 created valuable opportunities for personalising relationships within
 the state. Although no two meetings in some areas ever seemed to
 involve the same constellation of individuals, in others more than a
 decade of membership inevitably created some close friendships, often
 spanning a wide spectrum, even when departmental interests were at
 stake. Although the compulsory system of participation for delivering
 problems into the hands of higher authority has gone, alliances and
 understandings, especially at the lower levels of the state, may well, in
 some areas, perpetuate the N. S. M. S. by more informal means.
 Comparisons of certain organisational arrangements before and after
 the I98os also show how the N. S. M. S. has left its mark. For example,
 the practice had long been to have a relatively small South African
 38 The Secretary of Cabinet, 'Handleiding: nasionale koordineringsmeganisme (MKM)', Cape
 Town, 22 March i990, pp. i-3ff.
 39 Half the posts in the S. S. C.'s secretariat were scheduled to be phased out by the end of 1990,
 mainly by the abolition of the research and training sections. Information supplied by
 A. P. Stemmet, 5 March i990.
 40 Ibid. i November 1989, and by P. du Preez of MILISTAN, a private firm specialising in
 military contracts, 20 December I989.
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 Police (S.A.P.) force that was backed up in emergencies by members
 of the S. A. D. F. and other personnel. However, for a variety of reasons,
 the use of national servicemen, municipal police, and special constables
 (police with abbreviated training) proved to be counter-productive,
 ineffective, and politically undesirable. This helps to explain why the
 S.A.P.'s budget was more than doubled between I985 and I989,41
 thereby enabling its authorised establishment to be drastically
 increased from nearly 41,000 to over 80,000.42
 Increased size demanded that changes be made in the traditionally
 top-heavy S.A.P. command-structure, and N.S.M.S. experience
 suggested how this should be accomplished.43 All ranking generals
 served in headquarters located in Pretoria, and from here line- and
 staff-directives were sent to the 19 magisterial districts. Since January
 1990, South Africa's police districts and stations have been placed in 12
 regions. In I I of these, the regional S.A. P. commissioner can finalise
 such important matters as deployment, logistics, operations, pro-
 motions, and transfers without higher authority. Although the I2th
 region is still the voice of the central state, the re-organisation is
 designed to allow the police to concentrate on preventing and fighting
 crime, not least because they are now more closely tied to communities
 and territory.44
 State administration is beginning to involve units containing people
 of all racial categories,45 a trend that runs counter to the older practice
 of ethnic exclusivity. The N. S. M. S. does not hold sole responsibility for
 these changes, but played a huge part in advancing the idea and
 practices of regionalised administration.
 ISSUES OF INTERPRETATION
 It needs to be stressed that information about the N. S. M. S.'s
 existence and operation is not available in readily accessible form.
 Besides being hidden by a battery of laws and regulations, it is scattered
 41 South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey, I986, Part I (Johannesburg,
 I988), p. 73, and i987/I988 (Johannesburg, 1989), p. 335.
 42 Annual Report of the Commissioner of the South African Police, 1984 (Pretoria, 1985), and ibid. I989
 (Pretoria, I990).
 43 With the exception ofjoint management centres, N. S. M. S. entities below the national level
 were eventually led by S. A. P. personnel who gained importance because of the actions of Veikoms.
 44 White Paper on the Organisation and Functions of the South African Police (Pretoria, I99I), and
 Annual Report, i989, p. 2.
 45 The blocs largely coincide with the I I policing regions: Eastern, Western, Northern, and Far
 Northern Transvaal; Eastern, Northern, and Western Cape; Natal, Orange Free State, Soweto,
 and Witwatersrand.
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 in local newspapers (such as the tender advertisements where
 upgrading was under way), in journalistic interviews with N. S. M. S.
 participants, in legal actions (such as the trial over the events in
 Crossroads during 1986), in printed materials circulating in townships,
 in stickers praising or criticising leaders, in political graffiti commenting
 on past or forthcoming events, in parliamentary questions and answers,
 and in state spending-patterns.
 Hence the necessity for any scholar in this field to repeat interviews,
 to cross-check information repeatedly, and to follow lines of information
 expecting only a tiny ultimate yield. In cost and time, these research
 methods are expensive, and this means that every 'fact' collected is
 likely to be endowed with a value it might otherwise not have been
 given. For an 'outsider', perhaps inevitably, the Afrikaans language
 and culture of many bureaucrats creates a barrier beyond which, one
 came to suspect, events were 'controlled'. The difference between
 rhetoric and reality leads to suspicions that governmental deceptions
 are intentional and systematic, particularly when state employees
 adopted a hostile and irritated attitude, as though the researcher's
 questions were dangerous and trivial.
 Although hard-pressed to avoid describing the development and
 operation of South Africa's security system in conspiratorial terms, I
 have tried in this article to be as specific as possible about cohesion and
 disunity, formalities and dynamics, and the extent or lack of control.
 Given this information and emphasis, what analytically can be made of
 the N.S.M.S.? Interpreted institutionally rather than strategically,
 three broad issues warrant discussion.
 i. The Significance of Administrative Ideology
 Recent state ideology, especially Total Onslaught/Strategy, has
 been usually interpreted as though state ideas, images, and words have
 a legitimising function. It is not surprising that the technicist language
 originated during the I97os, and that it is related to the de-racialisation
 of the state, to the rise of planning on a modernistic basis, to underlying
 political alliances, to ideological management of the failures of the
 reform process, and/or to the continuing need of surveillance.46 In the
 46 Debbie Posel, 'Language, Legitimation and Control: the South African state after I978', in
 Social Dynamics (Cape Town), Io, I, I984; Willem van Vuuren, 'Domination Through Reform:
 the functional adaptation of legitimising strategies', in Politikon (Pretoria), I2, 2, December 1985;
 Doreen Atkinson, 'Power, Surveillance and the New Administration in South Africa: some
 insights from Michel Foucault', Biennial Conference of the Political Science Association of South
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 late I98os, state ideologues abandoned Total for Revolutionary
 Onslaught. Instead of communist-inspired subversion directed by the
 Soviet Union, the new slogan was calculated to focus attention on the
 nation's developmental problems.
 Being part of the 'Third World's poverty and instability' legitimated
 state violence and rationalised the white electorate's fears of 'lowered
 standards'. A functional interpretation of state ideology is still valid,
 being reinforced by continuing views that 'military things are better',
 notably because of the need to justify 'control, hierarchy and power',47
 and by emphasising the importance of such notions as: a 'can-do'
 enthusiasm, unqualified commitment to the job, the shortest possible
 distance between a problem and its solution, control by command, and
 institutional simplicity. The society- and state-oriented functions of this
 ideology nevertheless remained logically connected. Militaristic admin-
 istration required a harsh depiction of the surrounding world. Chaotic
 and incapable of natural order, a third-world society permanently
 needed vigorous management.48
 Administrative ideology cannot only be a matter, however, of ideas
 having consequences. As Doreen Atkinson has suggested, recent state
 notions were rooted in traditional practices like labour control and
 societal manipulation. In other words, South Africa was simply seeing
 the latest rationalisation of- not a qualitative break with - deeply
 entrenched habits.49 These continued not because fresh calculations
 about what was best always reached the same conclusion as before, nor
 were old habits broken upon discovering new levers for shifting society
 in this or that direction. Judged on recent experience, rationalism was
 dwarfed by institutional context and dynamics. Administrative
 ideology in substantial measure derived from competition within the
 state, particularly in response to problems and challenges among
 departments of the first tier. Here self-interested dramatisations showed
 that bureaucrats were far more likely to be influenced by what they did
 to, and what was done to them by, other bureaucrats than by
 technocratic innovation. Their long and vivid memories made an
 administrative ideology.
 Africa, University of Stellenbosch, October 1987; and Wilmot G. James and Andre du Pisani,
 'End of a New Deal's Contradictions of Constitutional Reform', in James (ed.), The State of
 Apartheid (Boulder, 1987), pp. 37-50.
 47 B. C. Smith, Bureaucracy and Political Power (Brighton, 1988), p. I57.
 48 When the legacy of apartheid was raised, bureaucrats responded with the qualification that
 South Africa was a third-world society which had made mistakes. See Annette Seegers, 'The
 Government's Perception and Handling of South Africa's Security Needs', in D. J. van Vuuren
 et al. (eds.), South Africa: the challenge of reform (Pretoria, 1988), pp. 414-24.
 49 Atkinson, op. cit. p. i8.
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 The messages heard by state employees promoted the value of
 uncritically submitting to authority, of being aggressive against those
 violating conventional norms, of de-emphasising concern for individual
 human beings, and of encouraging thinking in rigid conventional
 terms. Hence the growth of cynicism, the preoccupation with the
 outwardly strong, and the belief that unregulated things are dangerous
 and wild.50 Being too heavily oriented towards bureaucratic interests
 and military ways, South Africa's administrative ideology, although
 appearing modernistic, was thoroughly indifferent to equality as a
 practice or principle.
 2. Institutionalising Cultural Habits?
 Although South Africa became increasingly dominated by Afrikaners
 after 1948, most analysts have shown little appetite for relating the state
 to cultural factors. In part, the reluctance is theoretically motivated.
 Many favour other concepts, especially class, but even those with
 anthropological inclinations are cautious. Cultures are rarely mono-
 lithic and scholars disagree about the nature and significance of the
 differences to be found in collections of sub-cultures. Others point to
 the fact that although the interests of one white minority are favoured
 by the state, the majority of its employees are neither Afrikaners nor
 have command of the language. Yet in researching the N.S.M.S., I
 have repeatedly been struck by certain of its characteristics which can
 only be described as 'cultural'.
 First, and perhaps the most prominent feature, is the stress on seeking
 agreement, expressed in, for example: spanwerk (teamwork), samewerking
 (co-operation), and various references to the extremely popular game
 of rugby football (like dinkskrum, or robust meeting of minds). In
 addition, there are the negative descriptions of not fitting into a team
 (such a person is a dwarstrekker, or recalcitrant), and the stress on
 resigning yourself to group-decisions (berus by die besluit).
 Second, there is conspicuous deference to authority. Employees must
 initially clear things with superiors (die saak eers uitklaar) to the point
 where one suspects that no entity below the highest level has any life of
 its own. Good bureaucrats are often simply described as loyal
 bureaucrats who have the right attitude (gesindheid) or persuadable
 50 These values are those of the so-called F-scale, as explained in T. W. Adorno et al., The
 Authoritarian Personality (New York, I950). The scale is used on the grounds that the military, as
 an institution, systematically embodies authoritarian values.
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 mind (oop kop), unlikely to second-guess or inhibit instructions with
 personal views. Good managers are tough men who inspire loyalty by
 sticking to the rules (onverbiddelik and streng). Innovation, especially by
 lower bureaucratic entities, is de-emphasised.
 Third, despite some deference to sound techniques, what ought to be
 done is most often explained in terms of power or flatly asserted. Almost
 wholly absent are descriptions of situations grounded in the abstract
 and general, like the realities of human nature or the tendencies of
 governments everywhere. You hear a great deal of past and present
 particulars, told in heavily anecdotal style.51
 The origins of this Afrikanerised style of management probably lie
 far in the past. Most of the formative political experiences of
 Afrikanerdom are still haunted by internal divisions. The Great Trek
 was, in fact, different treks that remained unreconciled. The two Boer
 Wars were plagued by fundamental disagreements over how to fight.
 Religious life split into different churches, divided to this day. Strong
 partisan choices have been made in favour of, for example, nation as
 opposed to empire, and the National rather than the United Party.
 Although the causes of these two centuries of divisions cannot be
 addressed here, abundant evidence exists for concluding that Afrikaners
 view kin in the spirit of radical egalitarianism. Among themselves, they
 are a collection of dwarstrekkers.
 With divisions a permanent danger, Afrikanerdom developed
 unifying mechanisms, including ideology. Another is to make decisions
 in a way that produces unity. No effort is spared to encourage
 inclusivity. When unity is obviously threatened, a decision will be
 postponed or diluted, but if, after long effort, actions have to be taken
 in the face of disagreement, those opposing are cast out and crushed.
 Organisations were shaped by mechanisms of decision-making that
 included strict chains-of-command that institutionalised deference to
 authority, although the latter is likely to be a group and not an
 individual. Since large gatherings invite divisions, power goes to groups
 that are as small as possible. And, superiors do not lead by command.
 Successful management of the like-minded demands consultation.
 Anthropologists may argue that, in the last resort, cultural differences
 are matters of degree and means. Since all cultures have ideological
 and institutional mechanisms of unity, Afrikanerdom is not exceptional.
 Even so, its cultural properties need to be addressed if we are to
 51 See Annette Seegers, 'Institutionalising a Cultural Style of Management? Afrikaners, the
 N. S. M. S. and State Power', Annual Conference of the Association of Sociologists of South Africa,
 University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2-5 July I989.
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 understand the state's devotion, through the N. S. M. S., to teamwork,
 to deference to authority, to decision-making by small groups, and to
 a consultative style of management, albeit all grounded in flat
 assertions about power.
 3. Papering the Cracks in the State?
 Most analysts have argued that the rise of the military can be
 explained by the following sequence of events. After losing its unifying
 republican goal, Afrikaner populism was replaced by a bureaucracy
 driven by the executive; formerly episodic black resistance gained
 greater scope and depth; the economic boom of the I96os gave way to
 a prolonged recession; and old mechanisms of control became
 unworkable. With the state in crisis, half-enlightened pockets of
 Afrikanerdom promoted reform, the S.A.D.F. advocated aggressive
 counter-revolutionary actions, and pro-military personalities moved
 into power.52
 These interpretations have advanced understanding, but they fail to
 relate the rise of the military to the N.S.M.S.'s strategy of seeking
 security by co-ordination on all levels of government. Although
 analysts are right to point out that the state was fractured, this was not
 primarily because intensified challenges made cracks appear in the
 mechanisms of control - it was deliberately broken into pieces long
 before the crisis of the I97os and I98os as a natural consequence of
 apartheid. Vertical divisions between the central, provincial, and
 municipal levels of government were not that unusual. Decades of
 legislation also, however, divided the state horizontally, notably by
 setting up the administration of society along racial categories in, for
 example, separate education departments. Another was to create
 Homeland institutions, further separating black South Africans along
 territorial lines.53
 These apartheid-inspired divisions have had many bureaucratic
 implications, not least because state employment grew 'at a rate
 greater than the growth in both total population and economically
 active population', including a 'tremendous growth in the number of
 52 Views about how a militarised state manages crisis can be found in: Grundy, op. cit. pp.
 49-57; Selfe, op. cit.; Stephen M. Davis, Apartheid's Rebels: inside South Africa's hidden war (New
 Haven and London, I987), pp. 158-202; and Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: the apartheid war
 machine (London, 1986).
 53 J. A. Lombard, 'Fiskale Beleid in Suid-Afrika', in The South African Journal of Economics
 (Johannesburg), 47, 4, I979, pp. 359-66, discusses the effects of the state's horizontal and vertical
 divisions on fiscal policy.
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 blacks working for the state'.54 As the numbers and cost of
 administration increased, however, so did inefficiency and incoherence.
 Many state functions, especially those involving internal security,
 transport, and communications, simply could not be split either
 ethnically and/or territorially.55 Horizontal divisions also tangled
 jurisdictional lines, compounded by competition and self-interested-
 ness, even among the white-dominated security agencies. For as long as
 apartheid reasoning stayed in place, the pieces in the administrative jig-
 saw could not come together - except on the basis of co-ordination
 induced by the threat of revolution.
 The much-vaunted rationalisation of the mid-I97os addressed the
 problems of a fractured state by reducing the number of departments,
 but improvements were predominantly confined to the first tier,56 and
 affected vertical more than horizontal divisions. The N. S. M. S.
 compelled participation in a host of specially designed administrative
 units, established one all-important chain-of-command, and sanctioned
 the crossing of jurisdictional boundaries - though not necessarily fiscal
 kingdoms - in the interests of three functional areas. But the new
 hierarchy simply could not, however, rationalise the entire admin-
 istration of the state. As the discussion showed, most N. S. M. S. entities
 lived erratically, springing to life mostly under the gun.
 Yet, although necessary to note that militarism and repression can
 continue by informal means, the more important legacy of the
 N. S. M. S. is that it sustained the impetus towards rationalisation. The
 view now taken by the Government is that coherence and greater
 efficiency can be achieved by regionalising administration in ways that
 override ethnicity. Key central ministries and departments have been
 re-organised along these lines and, within each of the 12 regions into
 which South Africa has recently been divided, various entities have
 been given wide discretionary power to cross ethnically-inspired
 jurisdictions.
 The rise of the N. S.M.S. with its peculiar internal design and its
 legacy must thus be related to the attributes of bureaucracies generally
 but, in greater measure, to the fractured nature of the South African
 state. As was the case with the origins of administrative ideology, the
 roots of this condition are to be found in past political logic.
 54 Barry Standish, 'Some Statistics on Public Sector Employment in South Africa, 1920-1980',
 Working Paper No. 69, University of Cape Town, September I987, p. 76.
 55 Lombard, loc. cit. p. 36I.
 5B See Paul S. Botes, 'Die Sentrale Administrasie', in Charles F. Nieuwoudt et al. (eds.), Die
 Politieke Stelsel van Suid-Afrika (Pretoria, I98I).
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 CONCLUSION
 This discussion of South Africa's national security system from I972
 to I990 has concentrated on its organisational characteristics. Crucial
 questions remain unanswered, including: Who decided on upgrading
 its entities? How was this done? How much money was involved? Who
 drew the boundaries of regions? But enough is now known to enable at
 least an initial assessment of the N. S. M. S. to be made, despite the fact
 that crucial areas remain a closed- though not necessarily a
 conspiratorial - world.
 The approach taken in this article should not be viewed as being at
 the expense of a strategic interpretation, which would focus on the
 relationship of the N. S. M. S. with society, and on how the regime in
 power has handled actual and perceived threats to its continued
 existence. The point is that the institutional nature of the national
 security system has influenced South African reactions to the world
 beyond the state. Moreover, it is necessary to describe and attempt to
 interpret the rise of administrative ideology, and the curious forms that
 bureaucratic imperatives have taken in the local context, in order to
 understand the South African state on an historical basis.
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